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Social Cohesion and Political Conflict in 20 
Welfare States
The Democratic Class Struggle Revisited 
Jonas Edlund and Arvid Lindh1
Introduction
In sociology, social class has traditionally been the most important factor for explaining 
and understanding societal conflicts and developments. And, for a long time, the estab-
lished central role of social class in theory was not an issue in mainstream sociological 
debate. However, reviewing the literature over the last decades, it is apparent that the 
rhetoric and debate about social class radically changed in the 1990s. In this wave of “new 
thinking”, class-critical arguments were raised, basically questioning whether social class 
is a relevant concept for understanding social stratification, conflict, and current develop-
ments in contemporary Western democracies. Identities and interests, it was argued, are 
reflexively self-composed rather than rooted in structural conditions (Pakulski and Waters 
1996). In particular, the diminishing link between class belonging and political preferences 
was stressed. “[C]lasses have declining politically relevant effects” as Clark and Lipset 
(2001, 79) wrote in a rather modest passage in their book: The Breakdown of Class Politics. 
Commenting on this class-critical movement in general, Grusky and Sørensen (1998, 1188) 
wrote: “This development constitutes a striking repudiation of our disciplinary heritage; in 
fact, it was not so long ago that commentators as mainstream as Stinchcombe (…) could 
allege, without generating much in the way of controversy, that social class was the one 
and only independent variable of sociological interest.”2 
The role of class in contemporary Western society has remained a major source of con-
troversy in sociology. In this chapter, we will explore how class conflicts are manifested in 
Western advanced welfare states. While most would agree, even the critics, that class is an 
important factor for understanding the historical emergence of the welfare state – as well 
as for explaining historical between-country variation in welfare policy design – there is, 
1 This chapter is a revised version of: Edlund, J. and Lindh, A., (2015). The democratic class 
struggle revisited: The welfare state, social cohesion and political conflict. Acta Sociologica, 
58(4): 311-328.
2 Apparently, Stinchcombe made this statement – in a sarcastic and provocative manner regard-
ing the pivotal role of class in sociology – at Berkeley in 1973 (Clark and Lipset 2001, 33).
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as hinted above, considerably less agreement concerning the relevance of class in con-
temporary Western society. The critics argue that class is becoming less important, if not 
negligible, for understanding contemporary patterns of social stratification, politics, and 
conflict in the Western countries, often citing the redistributive function of the welfare 
state and increased material welfare as important causal factors. Other schools of thought, 
however, still defend the application of class for making sense of observed patterns of 
social tension and political cleavage. This chapter attempts to resolve some of these dis-
agreements. 
An analytical distinction is made between social and political manifestations of class 
conflict. The concept of social conflict refers to tensions and antagonism between social 
categories located at different levels in the socio-economic hierarchy outside parliamen-
tary politics, for example, class conflicts played out primarily at the site of production 
or more or less violently in the streets. The concept of political conflict refers to class 
struggles that are mainly institutionalized within parliamentary politics and resolved in a 
“peaceful” way through the implementation of redistributive welfare state policies. 
The theory outlined in The Democratic Class Struggle (Korpi 1983) serves as the analyti-
cal starting point. The theory argues that in modern welfare states, institutionalized politi-
cal conflict tends to replace less institutionalized and unorganized social conflict. This is 
hypothesized to be more the case in encompassing welfare states, e.g., the Scandinavian 
welfare states, than in residual welfare states, e.g., the USA and Great Britain. 
While this theoretical construct emphasizes the role of class for understanding pat-
terns of conflict in Western societies, there is a significant number of scholars that takes 
a radically different view on the role of class. The main argument, as stated above, is that 
class may be important, but only as a purely historical phenomenon. For understanding 
contemporary social stratification and its implications, class is an irrelevant concept, or as 
Pahl (1996, 89) suggests: the concept of class is “ceasing to do any useful work for sociol-
ogy” in a paper titled: Is the Emperor Naked?  In the next section, we will provide a review 
of these class-critical arguments. This is followed by a section where we will develop the 
arguments about the continuing relevance of class in Western societies. The section ends 
with a number of testable hypotheses. Thereafter, data and measurements are described. 
Then follows the empirical section. The concluding section restates the main findings and 
discusses their implications.
The Historical Significance of Class and the “Death of Class” 
Thesis
There may be multiple causes behind social unrest and political antagonism between social 
groups in society. However, some factors seem to be more central than others. From a his-
torical perspective, class relations and inequalities have proven to be a recurring source of 
distributive struggles. The welfare state was the main social invention constructed in West-
ern countries with the specific aim of dampening social unrest caused by class inequalities 
encapsulated within a market capitalist economy (Marshall and Bottomore 1992; Korpi 
1983). However, reasons behind the implementation of welfare policies differed across 
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countries, and empirical studies demonstrate that the effects of these policies on social 
stratification and inequality were, and are, quite different (Korpi and Palme 2003). 
The power resources approach suggests that broad layers of the population have good 
reasons to prefer to locate societal bargaining in parliamentary politics rather than stay 
within a market relationship (Korpi 1983). This is because the political principle of “one 
person – one vote” does not have a counterpart when it comes to market relations. Fur-
thermore, within a democratic setting, it is argued that those in weak bargaining positions 
in the labor market favor redistribution of income by means of state-organized policy, 
while those with more market-derived resources are supposed to prefer a larger role for the 
market-property nexus in distributive processes (Korpi 2006, 172-75).  
When explaining the observed cross-country differences in the institutional setup of 
the welfare state, the power resources approach suggests that the key explanatory fac-
tors of the emergence and outcomes of the welfare state are the strategies and actions 
undertaken by organized labor in power struggles vis-à-vis capital, both in the spheres 
of production and in parliamentary politics. From a country-comparative perspective, the 
size and redistributive capacity of the welfare state vary positively with the strength of 
working-class organization. In short, in those countries where working-class mobilization 
was most successful – i.e., in Scandinavia – we find the most comprehensive welfare states, 
scoring comparatively higher on both social protection and redistributive capacity (Korpi 
and Palme 1998, 2003; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
Few would thus deny the prominent historical role of class mobilization in forming the 
modern welfare state. However, the arguments playing down the role of social class in 
contemporary societies when it comes to politics of redistribution are numerous and stem 
from different disciplines. And, quite ironically from a theoretical perspective, most of 
these arguments pertain in particular to the most comprehensive and redistributive welfare 
states – the Scandinavian ones.    
A shared intellectual property of these arguments is the following claim: In Western 
countries, class-based political representations and associated demands for reform are in 
a steady, or even accelerating, decline (Clark and Lipset 2001; Pakulski and Waters 1996; 
Inglehart 1997; Pierson 1996). The arguments for the diminishing relevance of class-based 
political conflict in contemporary welfare states emphasize different factors, but com-
mon themes are the following: the role of the welfare state and its redistributive effects 
on market-generated inequality; compositional changes in the labor market, for example, 
a shrinking segment of working-class occupations; increased heterogeneity in the social 
structure: class is complemented or superseded by new political cleavages; and rising lev-
els of material welfare and economic affluence.
The central components seem to be, at least in our view, the redistributive capacity of 
the welfare state for reducing market-generated inequalities and a historically rising level 
of economic affluence/development. The equalization of living conditions between social 
groups and the overall increase in levels of material welfare, the argument goes, reduce 
the likelihood that demands for additional redistributive policies will enter the political 
agenda; citizens, interest organizations, and political parties are more likely to stress other 
types of political issues. This suggests that in contemporary Western countries, where class 
inequalities have progressively decreased – largely due to the success of the modern wel-
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fare state – class becomes a non-significant force in shaping social identities and political 
actions. 
This family of arguments – suggesting that class should be largely irrelevant for under-
standing political conflicts in contemporary societies – is hereafter referred to as the death 
of class thesis (DCT), inspired by an attention-grabbing and provocative book title on the 
subject (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Applying the DCT in a cross-national Western world 
perspective, it is suggested that in countries where material inequality between classes is 
relatively low, the likelihood that class-related political conflicts will occur is much smaller 
than in countries characterized by pronounced material inequality. Thus, it appears that 
this prediction should be most valid in the Scandinavian countries, due to their combina-
tion of a universal comprehensive welfare state and a comparatively equal income distri-
bution, and least valid in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the USA and Great Britain, where 
we find a substantially less ambitious type of welfare state and comparatively high levels 
of income inequality.
Arguments for the Continued Relevance of Class:  
A Country-comparative Perspective
This section outlines a theoretical framework that deviates strongly from the DCT per-
spective. In short, we argue for the continuing relevance of class for understanding social 
divisions and conflict in contemporary Western political economies. However, we suggest 
that the particular character of class conflict is heavily influenced by the national socio-
economic context, in particular the institutional set-up of the welfare state and the associ-
ated level of material inequality.
Two principal types of class-based conflict are distinguished: one referring to political 
cleavages between classes, that is, political conflict or “class politics,” and the other refer-
ring to conflicts outside the domain of parliamentary politics, such as social tensions of 
more or less brutal character between classes, manifesting, for example, as physical and/
or psychological antagonism in the streets, or strikes and lockouts on the labor market. 
This type of conflict will hereafter be referred to as social conflict. In the following, we 
will provide arguments for why these kinds of class cleavages are likely to be of continued 
relevance for understanding (between-country variation in) modern welfare states.
The Welfare State and Social Conflict
The institutional configuration of the welfare state has a strong impact on the level of 
material inequality in a society. The larger the welfare state (i.e., comprehensive social 
insurance programs and social services provided as citizenship rights), the smaller the 
material differences across social groups. Thus, while the fundamental class structure is 
similar across countries, the degree of economic inequality across positions within the 
class hierarchy differs significantly between countries depending on their politico-institu-
tional characteristics (Korpi and Palme 1998; le Grand and Tåhlin 2013). Such institutional 
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effects are likely to have consequences for the lived experiences of ordinary citizens. As 
argued by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, 46): “The rich and the poor in a country with a 
highly unequal distribution of wealth … may live next to each other, but their lives do not 
intersect. … In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have any sense of a shared fate. 
… In turn, each group looks out for its own interests and is likely to see the demands of the 
other as conflicting with its own well-being. Society is seen as a zero-sum game between 
conflicting groups. … Government policies have a large impact on economic equality. Uni-
versal social programs that cater to the whole (or very broad sections) of society, such as 
we find in Scandinavian countries, promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
more equality of opportunity in areas such as education and the labor market. Both types 
of equality lead to a greater sense of social solidarity.” 
Such proclaimed institutional effects on social cohesion have been the basis for sug-
gestions that citizens in societies with greater equality tend to have greater trust in their 
fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Larsen 2013) and higher well-being (Wilkin-
son and Pickett 2010) compared to citizens living in relatively unequal societies. However, 
when it comes to research explicitly studying social conflict from a citizen perspective, 
empirical evidence is scarce. A couple of papers by Kelley and Evans (1995; 1999) indicate 
that citizens’ perceptions of the existence of class-based social conflict in society were 
most common in the United States, followed by other Anglo-Saxon countries, and least 
common in the European countries. 
The Welfare State and Political Conflict 
When it comes to the measurement of “class politics” from a citizen perspective, we find 
two common strategies in the existing literature. The first is to examine the relationships 
between class position and political party choice: class voting (e.g., Evans 1999). The sec-
ond strategy is to focus on specific social policy issues, and on the extent to which support 
for these policies differs across classes (e.g., Svallfors 1999). In this chapter we have chosen 
the second strategy, with an explicit focus on welfare state income redistribution. 
We see two benefits of applying this strategy. First, for both DCT proponents and their 
critics, the issue of income redistribution is a critical marker of class-relevant politics. On 
the one hand, DCT proponents maintain that the equalizing effects on economic conditions 
and opportunities caused by welfare state redistribution have already “succeeded in alle-
viating those problems it can most readily solve” (Inglehart 1990, 9). On the other hand, 
those arguing for the continued relevance of class stress that contemporary class conflicts 
are, to the extent that they are realized in action, “most often pursued on the terrain of the 
welfare state” (Svallfors 1999, 208).
Second, the strength of the class-vote link is not only dependent on the political orien-
tations of voters in different classes, but also on the strategies of political parties: “If par-
ties fail to present manifestos which appeal to the interests of different classes, then there 
is no reason for there to be a strong class-vote link” (Evans 1993, 451-52). Since we want 
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to focus on citizens rather than political parties or other organizations, relying on analyses 
of class voting would be suboptimal.3
In short, we suggest that the welfare state arrangements and the institutionalized power 
struggle they encapsulate are likely to consolidate – rather than dissolve – the political 
conflict patterns that were decisive during the formative years of the welfare state. More-
over, we argue that, as part of this institutionalization process, citizens are socialized into 
expecting/preferring that issues related to class inequality should be negotiated and cali-
brated mainly via redistributive welfare policy. Why?
First, in more encompassing welfare states, the systems of taxation, social spending, 
and redistribution involve a comparatively larger proportion of the citizenry – and their 
resources – than in relatively residual welfare states. Thus, the size of the welfare state not 
only determines its redistributive capacity, but also the extent of its influence on citizens’ 
everyday lives: citizens in more encompassing welfare states pay a larger share of their 
income in taxes and their livelihood is also more dependent on services provided by the 
welfare state (Edlund 2007). For these reasons, citizens in encompassing welfare states are 
likely to develop a stronger sense of “ownership” of the state and perceive stronger incen-
tives for being politically involved than citizens in meager welfare states (Persson and 
Rothstein 2015). 
Second, welfare policy arrangements can be conceptualized as institutionalized com-
promises/conflicts between different social groups or collective actors (Korpi 2001). Once a 
particular institution has been created, the central political actors involved in the process 
– defined here in a broad sense – can be characterized as institutional translators. These 
institutional translators are important for underpinning collective memories and world-
views among citizens (Rothstein 2000). Whether class has political meaning for citizens 
is thus likely to depend on whether or not institutional translators are rooted in class 
organizations. Rather than de-emphasizing the salience of class, an encompassing and 
redistributive welfare state where class-based organizations have been and continue to be 
substantial serves to maintain political conflict patterns structured around the class axis 
(Edlund 2007). Since countries with a strong historical track record of class organization 
and class politics typically also have the most ambitious welfare states today, we antici-
pate that political class conflicts are greater in encompassing welfare states than in less 
interventionist welfare states. Previous research points in this direction: studies on the 
class-preference link find that class differences in redistributive preferences are compara-
tively lower in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in the Scandinavian countries (Bechert and 
Edlund 2015; Edlund 2007; Svallfors 2006). 
3 For empirical studies on the changing political rhetoric exercised by parties and its conse-
quences for the observed class-vote link, see Jansen, Evans and de Graaf 2013; Evans and Tilley 
2012; Korpi 1993.
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Hypotheses
To summarize, we argue that although redistributive welfare policies may decrease class-
based social conflict this does not necessarily mean that class-based political conflict will 
diminish, as suggested by DCT proponents. Instead, as suggested by Walter Korpi (1983) 
in The Democratic Class Struggle, we argue that the modern welfare state transforms 
the character of class conflict. Rather than being played out at the site of production or 
taking the form of unorganized social unrest, class conflicts get institutionalized within 
parliamentary politics and resolved in a “peaceful” way through various redistributive 
and equalizing state policies. Hence, in modern welfare states, institutionalized political 
conflict “replaces” less organized social conflict – and more so in large encompassing 
welfare states than in small residual welfare states. The following hypotheses summarize 
the expected associations:
The larger the welfare state (Ha) and the lower the level of material inequality (Hb)... 
(H1) ... the lower the aggregate level of perceived tension between different groups within 
the class hierarchy – social conflict. 
(H2) ... the higher the level of class differences in preferences for redistribution – politi-
cal conflict. 
(H3) There is a trade-off at the country level: the weaker the political conflict, the 
stronger the social conflict, and vice versa.  
Data
The study uses data from the Social Inequality modules fielded in 1999 and 2009 by the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The working sample consists of respon-
dents in 20 relatively affluent countries with “mature” welfare state arrangements. For the 
following countries, data are available for both years: Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
States. Data from a single survey are available for Belgium, Finland, Italy, Japan, and 
Switzerland (2009), and Canada, Ireland, and the Netherlands (1999). As some countries 
lack information on class position for those outside the labor market, the working sample 
is limited to respondents currently active in the labor market (23,314 respondents). 
Measurements
Class Position
Classes can be understood as aggregations of positions in production units and labor mar-
kets. Individuals are sorted into class categories on the basis of occupation (ISCO88) and 
employment status (employee/self-employed), using the well-known EGP class schema 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The EGP is a weak class idiom. The approach does not 
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incorporate notions of consciousness, action, and group belonging as conceptual build-
ing blocks. According to this perspective, whether identities and interests are structured 
along the axis of class or by other structural locations, and whether these interests are 
transformed into political mobilization, should mainly be treated as empirical questions 
(Goldthorpe and Marshall 1996, 101f.). Following the routine of previous research on the 
subject (Svallfors 2006; Edlund 2007), the class schema used distinguishes six class posi-
tions: self-employed; service class I; service class II; routine non-manuals; skilled workers; 
unskilled workers. 
Social Conflict
When it comes to the measurement of social tensions/antagonism/conflict between classes 
in society, we focus on the aggregate level of perceived conflict between those at the upper 
level of the class hierarchy and those at the lower level, following the same strategy as 
Kelley and Evans (1995; 1999). The following battery is used to measure people’s percep-
tions of social conflict: 
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. 
In your opinion, in <country> how much conflict is there between… 
A. … poor people and rich people? 
B. … the working class and the middle class? 
C. … management and workers? 
D. … people at the top of society and people at the bottom? 
Response scale: Very strong conflicts; Strong conflicts; Not very strong conflicts; There 
are no conflicts.
Each item concerns the relationship between groups located at different levels within the 
socio-economic hierarchy. Items B and C refer explicitly to class-based cleavages, whereas 
item A refers to class-based economic inequalities understood in a broader sense. Item D 
does not refer explicitly to class. Still, from an empirical point of view, item D is highly 
correlated with the other three items. We therefore find it reasonable to enter all four items 
in a composite additive index. In addition, using a composite measure better allows for the 
possibility that public discourse concerning class conflict might be framed somewhat dif-
ferently in different national contexts. Cronbach’s alpha for the additive index is accept-
able for all countries, ranging from 0.70 (Netherlands 1999) to 0.88 (Spain 2009). For ease 
of comparison, the index is standardized to vary between 0 and 100, where a higher score 
represents stronger conflict.4 
4 For Canada and Japan, a 3-item scale standardized to range 0-100 is used due to missing data. 
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Political Conflict
The following item is the selected indicator for the measurement of attitude towards state-
organized income redistribution: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? – It is the respon-
sibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes.
Response scale: “Strongly agree” (coded as 100); “Agree” (75); “Neither agree nor dis-
agree” (50); “Disagree” (25); “Strongly disagree” (0). 
Very importantly, the degree of political conflict in any given country is determined by 
the level of class differences in attitudes towards income redistribution. If there are small 
(large) differences between classes in support for redistribution, then the level of political 
conflict is low (high). To clarify, this study aims to account for between-country variation 
in the level of class differences in preferences for redistribution. The aim is not to explain 
between-country variation in aggregate support for redistribution. 
The estimate of political conflict is retrieved through 20 separate OLS regression models 
(gender and age included controlling for compositional differences in countries), one per 
country, where the magnitude of differences between classes in their support for redistri-
bution indicates the level of political conflict in a country. The magnitude of class dif-
ferences – political conflict – is determined by the standard deviation of the five dummy 
variable estimates for class, a strategy commonly employed in research (cf., Hout, Brooks 
and Manza 1995; Brooks and Svallfors 2010). The larger the standard deviation, the larger 
the overall difference between classes.
Contextual Indicators:  
Size of the Welfare State, Material Inequality, and Economic Affluence
Our measure of the welfare state attempts to capture both the overall size and the redis-
tributive capacity of the state, which is a function of the levels of taxation and social 
spending (Åberg 1989; Edlund 1999). Our strategy is to use data on the outputs/effects of 
the welfare state instead of using indicators of specific institutional design characteristics. 
One major advantage of using output data is that publicly provided social services are also 
included in the measurement. To our knowledge, there are no comparative data available 
on institutional design for this specific domain of the welfare state. Moreover, it should 
be emphasized that the indicators used are highly correlated with more direct measures of 
welfare policy design. The higher the prevalence of universal/encompassing social insur-
ance programs, the higher the levels of taxation, social spending, and redistribution (Korpi 
and Palme 1998).
The size of the welfare state is measured by an additive index consisting of three indi-
cators: (i) tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (OECD 2013); (ii) social spending as a per-
centage of GDP (OECD 2013); and (iii) the level of government redistribution (Wang and 
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Caminada 2011).5 Each indicator is standardized which means that all indicators get equal 
weight in the composite index. The inter-indicator correlations are high (i-ii, .87; i-iii, .82; 
ii-iii, .87), suggesting that they cover the same underlying construct. The level of material 
inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient (post-tax and transfer household income) 
(Wang and Caminada 2011). A higher score represents greater inequality. The scores on 
each of these measures are constructed from data covering the ten-year period preceding 
the year of the survey. Thus, data covering the years 1989-1998 (mean score) are used for 
the 1999 survey, while data stretching from 1999 to 2008 (mean score) are used for the 
2009 survey.
These two measures are rather strongly correlated with each other, which underlines 
the fact that there is a strong relationship between welfare state institutions/outcomes and 
the level of economic inequality (Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). The 
data suggest that the larger the welfare state, the lower the level of material inequality 
(Pearson’s r = -.78).
In addition, the DCT suggests that economic affluence/development diminish the 
salience of class conflicts and other socio-economic cleavages (Inglehart 1990; 1997). We 
therefore include GDP per capita (OECD 2013) as a measure of economic affluence in the 
analysis. The correlations between GDP per capita and size of the welfare state and mate-
rial inequality are, respectively: Pearson’s r = .05 (p = .840) and Pearson’s r -.34 (p = .142). 
This means that there is no association between the size of the welfare state and economic 
affluence, and that there is a non-significant tendency that material inequality is lower in 
more affluent countries compared to less affluent countries. 
In the forthcoming analysis, the relationships between the two dependent measures and 
contextual variables will be explored and presented in the form of plot diagrams. A mea-
sure of association will also be displayed: the Pearson’s r coefficient. The unit of analysis 
is country (n=20).6 
5 Wang and Caminada (2011) calculate the change in the Gini coefficient pre- and post-taxes and 
transfers, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Since data from New Zealand and 
Portugal are not in this dataset, data for these countries are taken from OECD (2013). 
6 The unit of analysis in this chapter is country (n=20).  In the article that this chapter builds upon 
(Edlund and Lindh 2015), we used country-year (n=32). It should be underlined that this change 
of design has a negligible effect on the results. In the article, we applied multilevel modelling 
where we were able to distinguish between-country variation as well as over-time variation. The 
latter variation turned out to be close to nil. In short, irrespective of whether the relationships 
between country level characteristics and our measures of conflict are estimated using multilevel 
modelling or simple correlation analysis at the country level (as we do in this chapter) the main 
results and conclusions are remarkably similar. Moreover, we believe that the type of graphical 
representations provided in this chapter should be seen as complementing the more advanced 
analysis employed in the article – mainly because each country’s position in the diagrams is 
clearly displayed. 
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Empirical Results
The empirical analysis is performed in three steps. In the first step, the relationships between 
the aggregate level of social conflict and each of the macro-level factors are explored. The 
second step measures the associations between each of the macro-level factors and the size 
of political conflict. The third step analyzes the extent to which a potential country-level 
trade-off between the two types of class conflict is discernible in the data.
Step I: Exploring the relationships between country-level factors and social conflict
This step explores the extent to which the observed between-country variation in the 
aggregate level of social conflict is accounted for by the size of the welfare state, material 
inequality, and economic affluence, respectively. 
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Hypothesis H1a predicts a negative association between the size of the welfare state and the 
level of social conflict. As shown in Diagram A, the hypothesis receives empirical support. 
The aggregate level of social conflict tend to be smaller in large welfare states. The rela-
tionship is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level (p = .098). Next, as understood by 
hypothesis H1b, the central mechanism forging a link between the size of the welfare state 
and social conflict is the level of material inequality. The relationship between material 
inequality and the level of social conflict is shown in Diagram B. A strong positive rela-
tionship can be observed: social conflicts are more pronounced in countries with greater 
material inequality (p < .001). In other words, a substantial proportion of the observed 
between-country variation in the level of social conflict is explained by country differ-
ences in material inequality. In Diagram C, the importance of economic affluence (GDP per 
capita) is tested. Although the diagram shows a negative relationship, it is not statistically 
significant (p = .110). It is worth noting the position of USA in the diagram. While USA 
is among the wealthiest countries in the sample, it is among the top-scoring countries in 
perceived social conflict. 
 The empirical results in this section lend some support to our theoretical argument:  the 
larger the welfare state (H1a), and the lower the level of material inequality (H1b), the less 
severe the social conflict. 
Step II: Exploring the relationships between country-level factors and political conflict
As will be shown below, the level of political conflict, defined by the magnitude of class 
differences in support for state-organized redistribution, differs extensively across coun-
tries. The question now is to what extent can the observed cross-country variation in 
political conflict be accounted for by the macro-level factors?
Diagram D shows that class differences in preferences for redistribution are significantly 
greater in large encompassing welfare states than in meager welfare states (p < .001). Dia-
gram E, focusing on the role of material inequality, reports similar hypothesis-supportive 
findings: class differences are substantially weaker in highly unequal countries compared 
to countries with greater equality (p < .001). Diagram F indicates that economic develop-
ment does not have any substantive influence on the level of political conflict (p = .539).
In line with hypotheses H2ab, the results in Diagrams D and E indicate that the level of 
political conflict, measured as the magnitude of class differences in preferences for state-
organized redistribution, is comparatively higher in countries where citizens are embedded 
in a context characterized by an encompassing and redistributive welfare system with 
a relatively low level of economic inequality. It should also be noted that the economic 
affluence thesis advocated by DCT proponents (Diagram F) does not receive convincing 
empirical support.
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Step III: Exploring a potential country-level trade-off between social and political conflict
The next step of the analysis examines the relationship between social and political con-
flict at the country level. As stated in H3, a trade-off at the country level between the level 
of social conflict and the level of political conflict is anticipated. Interpreting Diagram G 
in terms of support/rejection of H3, the displayed association is clearly biased in favor of 
the hypothesis, suggesting a trade-off between social and political conflict. As shown, in 
countries where the level of perceived social conflict is higher, the level of political conflict 
is lower, and vice versa (Pearson’s r = -.49; p = .030). 
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Conclusions
Are contemporary welfare states characterized by class conflict or has the class concept 
lost its significance for understanding social and political struggles in today’s society? This 
chapter considers this issue from a new angle by studying class conflict from a “citizen 
perspective”. 
In our view, the results in this study make it difficult to defend the “death of class” thesis 
suggesting that the concept of class has become irrelevant in modern industrial democra-
cies. Instead, the results are in line with The Democratic Class Struggle thesis, which sug-
gests that the character of class conflict varies across national socio-economic contexts 
in tandem with between-country variation in the institutional setup of the welfare state.
Results show that in countries where the welfare state is meager and material inequal-
ity is extensive, citizens perceive that their society is characterized by social tensions 
and conflicts between classes to a greater extent than citizens living in countries with 
comparatively encompassing welfare states and lower levels of equality. When it comes to 
class-based conflicts in distributive processes within parliamentary politics, the opposite 
pattern can be observed. Hence, it is too simplistic to conclude that the welfare state has 
a uniform impact on class conflict tout court. Instead, the character of the welfare state 
matters for what aspect of class conflict – social or political – that dominates in a country.
Thus, while it is true that class is of limited importance in terms of our understanding of 
citizens’ political orientations in residual welfare states, this does not mean that class rela-
tions are in harmony or non-existent in these countries. In these countries, citizens – whether 
they are located at the upper or lower level of the socio-economic ladder – comparatively 
more often view their own society as marked by tensions between classes.7 In other words, 
7 The observation that class differences in perceptions of social conflict are in general quite 
small and, furthermore, do not vary significantly across countries, is described in more detail in 
Edlund and Lindh (2015).
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the role of class as a vehicle for social tension and antagonism should not be underestimated. 
Correspondingly, while citizens in encompassing welfare states perceive limited social con-
flict, distributive struggles remain institutionalized within parliamentary politics, as dif-
ferent classes continue to express highly diverging preferences concerning redistribution. 
Why are political conflicts more pronounced in encompassing welfare states? After all, 
material conditions tend to be relatively equally distributed across classes. From a power 
resources perspective, a key causal factor explaining these findings is the extent to which 
organized labor has been successful in transferring distributive struggles from the labor 
market into parliamentary politics, thereby converting these initially informal, particular-
istic, sometimes violent, non-institutionalized conflicts into democratic class struggles. As 
part of this institutionalization process, the institutional setup of the large redistributive 
encompassing welfare state – situated within a context of institutional translators orga-
nized along the class axis – preserves the concept of redistribution as a salient political 
issue and makes citizens orient themselves politically on the basis of class interests and 
identities. Correspondingly, while many citizens in meager welfare states – such as the 
USA – perceive society as marked by class-based social tension, they do not necessarily 
turn to the political system and asking for redistributive social policy reforms to negotiate 
and/or resolve class conflicts. 
The power resources approach suggests that broad layers of the citizenry have good 
reasons to prefer that distributive struggles get settled within the domain of parliamentary 
democratic politics, and not be scattered to other spheres of society. Similarly, normative 
democratic theory suggests that parliamentary democratic politics constitute a construc-
tive device for resolving societal conflicts in a legitimate and “peaceful” context. In this 
respect, it deserves to be underscored that our findings suggest that political cleavages 
do not have a negative impact on social cohesion. If anything, the results suggest that 
political deliberation is associated with a higher level of social cohesion. In this sense, 
this chapter offers some support for the claim that the encompassing welfare state can be 
understood as a manifestation of a successful large-scale societal compromise between 
partly conflicting interests rooted in the mode of capitalist production. 
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